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 
Abstract—In a supervisory control system the human agent’s knowledge of past, current, and future system 
behavior is critical for system performance. Being able to reason about that knowledge in a precise and 
structured manner is central to effective system design. In this paper we introduce the application of a well-
established formal approach to reasoning about knowledge to the modeling and analysis of complex human-
automation systems. An intuitive notion of knowledge in human-automation systems is sketched and then cast 
as a formal model. We present a case study in which the approach is used to model and reason about a classic 
problem from the human-automation systems literature; the results of our analysis provide evidence for the 
validity and value of reasoning about complex systems in terms of the knowledge of the system’s agents. To 
conclude, we discuss research directions that will extend this approach, and note several systems in the 
aviation and human-robot team domains that are of particular interest. 
 
Index Terms—Formal specifications, knowledge in multi-agent systems, man-machine systems. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 human operator’s knowledge regarding a complex system’s past, current, and future behavior is elemental to 
system performance. Indeed, issues of the existence, content, and validity of operator knowledge in a complex 
human-automation system underlie many major threads of research in the human-machine systems community. 
These research threads include broad and active domains such as situation awareness (briefly, an operator’s 
knowledge of the relevant elements in the environment), mode awareness (operator knowledge of a system’s current 
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operational state), and mental models (knowledge and beliefs regarding a system’s components, possible behaviors, 
and interdependencies). In a basic sense, all these domains are concerned with aspects of the operator’s knowledge 
and aim to define both theoretical frameworks and evaluative criteria for determining whether that knowledge is 
satisfactory for system performance. 
Since human operator knowledge is a fundamental element of system performance, we argue that it is important 
to reason about that knowledge, and its role in controlling system performance, in a precise and structured manner. 
Moreover, as increasingly complex human-automation and human-robot systems are developed, the need for tools 
that support the design and evaluation of these systems from the perspective of the agents' knowledge becomes an 
imperative. Consider, for instance, the knowledge possessed by the human and automation agents in advanced flight 
deck information systems, in systems of human supervisory controllers and multiple autonomous vehicles, or in 
robot-assisted search and rescue teams. Sophisticated tools are required to effectively analyze the complex and 
subtle interactions between what the human and non-human agents know in these and similar systems. 
To be useful, a reasoning approach must satisfy a number of modeling and analysis requirements. In particular, 
knowledge in a system must be a well-defined entity or resource that can be directly represented, manipulated, and 
analyzed. Properties of knowledge unique to human agents must be expressible. Since our focus is the correct 
performance of the complete system, and since non-human agents play equally important albeit different roles, we 
will in many cases need to be able to capture and reason about the 'knowledge' of the non-human agents in the 
system. Finally, since systems are dynamic, it will be necessary to represent the evolution of knowledge over time, 
and how that knowledge both influences and is influenced by system behavior.   
In this paper we introduce a formal approach to reasoning about knowledge in human-automation systems that is 
based on a model of knowledge developed by Halpern and Moses and their colleagues [1]-[3]. Their methodology 
combines the formal rigor of epistemic logic with intuitive and direct notions of knowledge and action in multi-
agent systems, and thus provides a means of reasoning about systems at the level of the agents' knowledge. To date, 
existing applications of the approach focus primarily on systems in which all agents are non-human (e.g., 
communication protocols for distributed computer systems [1], [4], robot motion planning [5], adding notions of 
knowledge and communication to discrete event control systems [6], [7]). We argue that this formalism can be 
equally valuable for reasoning about knowledge in systems in which one or more agents are human, if properties of 
knowledge that are unique to human agents can be expressively captured.  
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The value of reasoning about knowledge in the analysis of socio-technical systems has already been noted
 
in the 
literature [8], [9]. In the papers cited, the authors discuss an approach combining knowledge, timed automata and 
Activity Theory, and propose a case study of an aviation accident. From the brief description presented, it appears 
that their work focuses on the temporal aspect and does not model knowledge explicitly. Our approach makes use of 
a fine-grained analysis of knowledge based on a careful model of the different entities' local states, along the lines of 
Fagin et al.[1]. This enables us to establish rigorous claims regarding the roles of knowledge, and the lack of 
knowledge, in human-automation interaction and supervisory control of complex systems. Our contribution is thus 
to propose a cohesive formal framework for the modeling and analysis of knowledge in these systems.  
In this article, we present the theoretical foundations of our approach, and sketch a case study. The article is 
structured as follows. Within the domain of complex human-automation systems in which the human’s role is that of 
supervisory controller, we first define more precisely a notion of human knowledge in a complex system. We also 
put forth basic criteria for what it means for a human operator's knowledge to be satisfactory for system 
performance. We then describe the main concepts and elements of the knowledge formalism as developed by Fagin 
et al., and present a variation that provides a more expressive language for modeling human-automation systems. 
Following, we consider a case study in which our formalism is used to model and reason about the Therac-25 device 
problem, a classic problem in the human-automation systems literature [10]. We provide a brief overview of the 
relevant aspects of the problem, and construct a knowledge-based model. We then use the model to evaluate the 
knowledge in the system against formally defined criteria, and show how a solution can be derived and then 
validated. To conclude, we present our views regarding the potential value of the approach for reasoning about 
knowledge in a variety of human-automation and human-robot systems, and outline a number of research directions 
that will expand the value of the approach as a means of modeling complex systems. 
II. HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS  
Human knowledge is a significant and intriguing topic for study in many domains. Philosophers from ancient 
times have considered fundamental questions such as the nature of knowledge and the origin of its existence, and 
began the development of logics and formal modeling in order to more precisely reason about these complex and 
often subtle concepts [11]. In more contemporary times, scholars in fields such as Artificial Intelligence and 
Cognitive Science have variously interpreted and re-interpreted the concept of knowledge in order to explore their 
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particular domains, focusing for example on notions such as knowledge representation and knowledge-based agents 
that are fundamental to AI. Valuable outgrowths of work in these and other important fields include both strong 
support for the critical value of knowledge as a formal construct, and richly descriptive tools for precisely describing 
and reasoning about knowledge [12]-[15]. 
Our own goal is to draw on this formal approach as a means of reasoning precisely about complex human-
automation systems. More specifically, we aim to use this well-structured notion of knowledge to model and analyze 
the design of complex systems for which the human’s knowledge is required for supervisory control. The ability to 
describe in exact terms what a human operator must know in order to control a system, coupled with the ability to 
describe, in like terms, what that human can be expected to know as a function of the interface, offers a rigorous 
approach to the analysis of complex human-automation system design efficacy. 
A. A Notion of Operator Knowledge 
So that we may reason formally about operator knowledge in the context of complex systems, we first need to 
conceptualize operator knowledge in supervisory control in a manner that will be amenable to capture within a 
formal framework. In this section we discuss types of knowledge that an operator may need to control a complex 
system, and then examine several additional characteristics of operator knowledge that should also be captured in 
our framework. 
1) Knowledge Types  
The concept of knowledge in the literature is often partitioned and variously classified, with each research domain 
categorizing knowledge in the way that is most suited for its theories and constructs. Since our focus at present is the 
knowledge of a human supervisory controller within the context of a complex system, we need to cast our notion of 
knowledge accordingly. What is the knowledge that is required for supervisory control?  
Sheridan notes that to function as a supervisory controller, the human agent must be able to command the system 
in accordance with defined specifications, monitor the system’s behavior to ensure that it performs as required, and 
identify and correct anomalous system behaviors [16], [17]. It is straightforward to interpret these supervisory 
control tasks in terms of knowledge: the effective human operator needs both knowledge of the current state and 
behaviors of the system, and knowledge of the rules defined by the system specifications. To represent these 
knowledge requirements correctly, our approach will need to capture the knowledge of current system state 
available from the automated system’s interface (e.g. the displays) as well as the knowledge that the human operator 
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is expected to possess regarding the rules of possible and acceptable system behavior. 
a) Explicit knowledge 
The information available from the human-automation interface at any given point in time is the source of the 
operator’s explicit knowledge.1  We wish to say, for example, that a competent human driver explicitly knows that 
the current speed of the car she is driving is 40 miles per hour since that value is displayed on the speedometer. 
While the relationship between displayed information and useful knowledge may depend on non-trivial factors such 
as the agent correctly perceiving the display and understanding its meaning, the compatibility of the display format 
to the task, and so forth [18], we assume here that the display type, quality, and information saliency are adequate 
for the task at hand. Explicit knowledge is needed for supervisory control tasks such as monitoring system health 
and status; it is also necessary for tasks such as synchronizing the actions of interacting or otherwise interdependent 
system components (e.g., not opening a tank cover until the internal pressure of the tank has dropped below some 
pre-defined level). 
b) Mental model knowledge 
A second type of knowledge needed for human-supervisory control is the 'knowledge-in-the-head' that the human 
agent possesses regarding the global behaviors and properties of the physical system with which he is interacting 
[19]-[21]. This mental model knowledge can be thought of as a collection of inferences that the operator knows to 
make about the system. Mental model knowledge is required both for reasoning about and interpreting current 
interface information as well as for future-oriented supervisory control tasks such as planning and scheduling, 
troubleshooting, and decision-making [16]-[18]. We assume that the operator’s mental model knowledge also 
includes what we shall call ground knowledge – essential domain-relevant knowledge that the human agent may be 
assumed to possess, such as basic logical and computational skills. We suggest that this knowledge is ‘automatic’ in 
nature and thus requires almost no effortful thinking or reasoning action [18], [22]. For instance, it seems correct to 
assume that a human agent who is sufficiently skilled to act as supervisory controller of a complex system, should 
be able to automatically compare two displayed integers and determine which of them is greater. 
Mental model knowledge is normally based in fact (e.g. through training). However, since it evolves over time as 
a result of repeated interactions, mental model knowledge may grow to include some proportion of unproven (and 
 
1 It is worth mentioning that the human-automation interface need not be visual; our intent is any interface that provides the operator with 
information relevant to system behavior. 
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perhaps incorrect) beliefs [23]. For any typically-sized complex system the human operator’s mental model 
knowledge is clearly incomplete, as the number of potential system behaviors under all possible conditions is too 
large to be known. 
2) Characteristics of Human Knowledge  
In order to develop a representation that allows us to reason accurately as well as expressively about human 
supervisory control knowledge within the context of complex systems, we need to consider several additional 
aspects or characteristics of operator knowledge.  
a) Reasoning and knowledge 
In a practical sense, what the operator knows at any given moment is the result of interpreting the explicit 
knowledge available using the mental model knowledge. Precisely how humans reason, the rules of inference that 
guide their reasoning activities, or indeed whether humans use any form of mental logic at all are on-going and 
strongly debated questions in the literature [24]. The goal of this paper is not to add to that debate, nor to make 
claims regarding the actual processes by which humans reason, or the specific rules of logical inference they may 
use. To capture a notion of reasoning useful for our purposes, we will assume that the human supervisory controller 
has the ability to reach at least a particular set of conclusions that are generated by a small set of deductions that are 
part of her mental model.  
For example, consider that at a given moment in time the driver agent explicitly knows that the allowable speed is 
25 mph (she just passed the speed limit sign), and that her current actual speed is 40 mph as displayed on the 
speedometer. Further, assume that the set of facts that comprise her mental model includes the inference that an 
actual speed greater than an allowable speed may result in a speeding ticket. The inference will then allow the 
human agent to deduce the (quite important) conclusion that she is currently in danger of receiving a ticket. 
b) Human computational ability 
A related characteristic of human reasoning ability and the knowledge that results is the question of the operator’s 
computational power – even if the operator only reaches conclusions based on the inferences in her mental model, 
how many conclusions can she reach in a bounded period of time? If a conclusion requires conclusions from other 
inferences as inputs or antecedents, how long can this chain of inferences be before the human operator is 
overwhelmed? As research shows, human computational power is quite limited [18], [22], [25] and even more so in 
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the time- or safety-critical environments within which most complex systems function [26]. In order to capture some 
reasonable facsimile of the knowledge of a supervisory controller, our approach will have to limit the number of 
inferences that the operator can make at a given moment.   
B. When Does An Operator Know Enough?  
If our aim is to provide a practically useful methodology and tool set for the design and analysis of complex 
systems from the perspective of agent knowledge, we must provide not only a formal means of describing 
knowledge in these systems, but also formal metrics against which knowledge in systems can be rigorously 
evaluated. Though the human agent's knowledge of a complex system's possible behavior is incomplete by 
definition due to the size of the state space, we propose that at a minimum, the human agent’s knowledge must be 
sound and adequate. We describe these properties next, and note that if they hold, we shall say that the human 
agent's knowledge is satisfactory.  
1) Soundness 
We will say that the human agent's knowledge is sound at a given system state if the facts that the agent is said to 
know and the inferences that the agent can make there are true. As we discuss in following sections, soundness is a 
fundamental property of knowledge that is formalized as the Knowledge Axiom, stating that only what is true can be 
known [1]. A formal definition of knowledge for human agents is sound if the Knowledge Axiom holds at all states 
of the system of interest. 
2) Adequacy 
While an agent’s knowledge in a complex system will necessarily be incomplete, the knowledge must be adequate; 
in particular, it must guarantee her ability to identify anomalous or 'illegal' behaviors or states (i.e. not in accordance 
with system specifications). In other words, though the agent will not know, a priori, all the possible behaviors that 
a system may exhibit, she must always be able to determine when the current system behavior is 'bad'.  
Having discussed basic notions related to human knowledge in supervisory control, we next provide a brief 
introduction to the basic elements of the knowledge formalism in order to recast our model. 
III. REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE – AN INTRODUCTION 
A. Elements of the Framework 
The knowledge formalism was originally adapted to distributed and multi-agent systems by Halpern and Moses 
 8 
and was expanded on in numerous writings [1], [2], [5], [27]-[30]. It includes structures to represent the entities or 
agents in the system and the knowledge they can be said to possess. The formalism also includes a means for 
describing the interaction of knowledge and action and the behavior of the system. It thus provides a rigorous 
methodology for reasoning about knowledge in a dynamic multi-agent system, and for analyzing and proving 
properties of that knowledge. Here we focus on the elements of the formalism that are relevant to the present work, 
and describe how knowledge is defined using these elements. The primary references for this part are [1]-[3]. Once 
the foundations of the formalism have been presented, we introduce a number of concepts that will enable more 
expressive representation of knowledge properties of human agents. 
1) Agents 
The formalism considers agents and systems of multiple interacting agents, where an agent might be a robot, a 
processor, a human, a physical object, or any other entity of interest in the system. The approach includes the 
external environment as an agent, albeit a special type of agent, whose behavior is not under the control of the other 
agents in the system. In general, the environment’s role is to represent all that is relevant to the system that is not 
captured by the other system agents. In this paper we focus on systems involving a single human agent h, 
(intuitively, this is the operator), a single “automaton” agent a – the complex system that h operates, and the 
environment agent e. In modeling the speedy driver, for example, we could capture the driver as human agent h, the 
car as the automaton agent a, and the outside world (including, for instance, traffic lights and whether or not there is 
a policeman watching) as the environment e.  
2) Local states, global states, and agent knowledge 
When reasoning about knowledge, we are typically interested in modeling a dynamic situation in which the world 
evolves, and with it the state of knowledge of the agents. In this section we consider a natural way to model these. 
We think of every agent at any given instant as being in a well-defined local state. The local state in our setting 
captures all of the information that is available to the agent at a given instant. This is the information available to the 
agent when it determines its next action. The precise structure and contents of this local state depends on the system 
that is being modeled. 
A global state corresponds to a snapshot of the state of the agents in the world frozen at an instant. In our three-
agent setting, a global state would be modeled by a triple (se, sh, sa), where si is agent i’s local state, for i=e,h,a. 
Intuitively, an agent’s local state captures exactly what is visible to the agent at the current point - the agent’s 
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knowledge depends solely on its local state. The agent is able to distinguish between two global states exactly if its 
local state in one is different from its local state in the other. For example, consider a car in which there is an 
indicator light for low brake fluid. As long as the indicator light is off, the driver cannot distinguish whether or not 
the brake fluid is leaking. All the driver knows is that the fluid level is not below the critical level. Indeed, if the 
indicator is not fully reliable, then the driver cannot distinguish a situation in which the indicator is working and the 
fluid is sufficient, from one in which the fluid level is critical but the indicator is malfunctioning. The formalism 
thus allows us to accurately model and reason about situations in which agents have only partial knowledge of 
system behavior. The state se is called the local state of the environment, and it accounts for all else that is relevant to 
the analysis, possibly keeping track of aspects of the world that are not part of any agent’s local state (e.g., a traffic 
light).  
3) Dynamic system behavior 
The evolution of a world over time produces a history, which in our terminology will be called a run. Formally, a 
run r is a function from time to global states, assigning to every time instant m a global state r(m). If  r(m) = (se, sh, 
sa), then we denote by ri(m) the local state si, for i=h,a,e. 
It is often convenient to identify time with the natural numbers, in which case the run is identified with the 
sequence r = r(0), r(1), . . .. Facts, represented in our framework by formulas of L, are considered true or false at a 
point (r,m), consisting of a run r at a time m. The truth of non-epistemic facts (ones that do not involve knowledge) 
at (r,m) can usually be determined based on  the global state r(m) at that point.  
We choose to model the types of human-automation systems that we are interested in as consisting of three 
agents; the human agent h, the automation agent a, and the environment agent e. With this construction we can focus 
on the human ‘knower’ h, and capture how h’s knowledge influences and is influenced by the behavior of the 
complete system. Thus, at any given time each agent i, for i = e, h, a, will be in a local state li, representing all the 
information that i has available at that time. We denote by Li the set of i's possible local states. As in the general case 
noted above, the tuple of all the agents’ local states is a global state g. The set G of all global states is then the 
Cartesian product G = Le x  Lh x  La of the sets of local states. In a given application, there can be dependencies 
between elements in the agents’ local states (e.g. shared data) and the set of global states that will appear in a 
relevant set of runs R will usually be a subset of G.  
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The dynamic behavior of the system is represented by the set of runs R is generated by the joint actions of the 
environment, automation, and human agents. 
4) The logical language 
We need a language in order to rigorously reason about knowledge in complex systems, and so now formally 
define a logical language for this purpose. In any given application, there are a (typically small) number of basic 
facts of interest. These can be the status of the traffic light, the speed of the car, the direction it is driven at, etc. We 
call such basic facts primitive propositions. In each application or system being considered, we assume that a set  
of the relevant primitive propositions is given. These will be the basic formulas of our logical language. We create 
more complex formulas inductively by applying logical connectives to simple formulas. Formally, we will be 
working with a logical language L , which is the set of formulas defined as follows  
 Every primitive proposition p   is a formula, 
 If  and  are formulas then so are  
         (standing for not )  
       (standing for  and ),  and  
 Ki        (standing for agent i  {h,a } knows ). 
We define only the two Boolean operators  and  because all other Boolean operators are definable using these 
two [31]. (For example,      corresponding to “ implies ”, can be defined as shorthand for (  ).) The 
language L allows us to express rich and complex statements such as   Kh   which reads that “if  is true 
and agent h does not know , then  must be the case.” Such a formula would be true, for example, if  stands for 
the brake fluid level being critical, and  stands for the fact that the indicator is malfunctioning. In fact, while we 
will not expand into a discussion of one agent’s knowledge of another agent’s knowledge in this paper, our language 
allows us to talk about what the human knows about the automaton's knowledge, what the automaton knows about 
the human's knowledge, etc. 
The propositions p,q,…  and indeed all formulas of L are initially strings that we may intend to ascribe 
meaning to. We consider that the set of propositions  represents the basic facts about the system that may be 
derived from the design specification. The truth of a primitive proposition p   is defined by way of an 
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interpretation  that maps every  and g to True or False. Thus, if (p)(g)=True then proposition p is true at the 
global state g.  
Knowledge changes over time as an agent learns new facts and forgets some that are known. Thus a formula is 
considered true or false at a time m in a history (or run) r in a system or model R. We can think of a world as 
consisting of a tuple (R,,r,m) where R is a system,  is the interpretation for the propositions of  at states of R, r is 
a history (or run) in R, and m is the point in time at which we are evaluating truth of formulas. The pair (r,m) is a 
point, and if r is in R, then it is a point of R. We denote the fact that a formula  is true, or satisfied at a world 
(R,,r,m) by (R,,r,m) |=  . The satisfaction relation |= is formally defined by induction on the structure of . 
Primitive propositions p   form the base of the induction, and their truth is determined according to the 
interpretation : 
 (R,,r,m) |= p (for a primitive proposition p  ) iff (p)(r(m)) = True . (1)  
Negations and conjunctions are handled in the standard way: 
 (R,,r,m) |= ¬ iff (R,,r,m) |= . (2)  
 (R,,r,m) |=   ’ iff both (R,,r,m) |=  and (R,,r,m) |= ’. (3)  
 
For a formula Ki , the clause (R,,r,m) |= Ki states that Ki (i knows ) is satisfied at the point (r,m) in system 
R. We will now discuss when this may hold.  
5) Knowledge as truth in all possible worlds 
The formal definition of knowledge is traditionally framed within the notion of possible worlds [13], [14]. Two 
points (r,m) and (r’,m’) are considered to be indistinguishable for agent i, which we denote by (r,m)~i(r’,m’), if i has 
the same local state in the global state r(m) as in r'(m'). 
Intuitively, if (r,m)~i(r’,m’) then at (r,m) agent i can equally imagine that the actual state is (r’,m’). Hence (r’,m’) 
is considered a possible world for i at (r,m).  
The possible-worlds definition of knowledge states that an agent knows a fact precisely if this fact is true in every 
state or world that the agent considers possible. If two points (r,m) and (r’,m’) are indistinguishable to an agent, and 
the fact  is false at (r’,m’), then at (r,m) the agent cannot be said to know that  is true. More formally,  
 (R,,r,m) |= Ki holds iff (R,,r',m') |=  holds for all points (r',m') with r’R  (4)  
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that satisfy (r,m) ~i(r',m'). 
  
Observe that the four clauses (1)–(4) above defining the satisfaction relation `|=' enable us to determine, for every 
formula L and every world (R,,r,m), whether  is or is not satisfied at the world.  
This definition of knowledge is a powerful and useful tool for the description and analysis of properties of multi-
agent systems, and enables formal proof of agent knowledge or, alternately, the impossibility of that knowledge. 
However, several fundamental properties of the approach make it problematic for modeling human agents in human-
automation systems. We briefly mention these properties here prior to discussing the modifications to the definition 
that will allow a more appropriate and expressive representation of the knowledge of human agents (cf.[13]).  
6) Logical omniscience 
One of the most important difficulties with applying the traditional possible-worlds definition of knowledge to 
human agents is that it implies a notion of logical omniscience. Intuitively, logical omniscience refers to the fact that 
if an agent knows a set of facts it will also know all logical consequences of that set. In our context, logical 
omniscience suggests that in any state an agent will know all the facts that follow from the information available in 
that state. That is, the agent’s knowledge in this case is closed under logical inference. Though this may be a fair 
assumption for an agent with a powerful capacity for reasoning, the typical human agent clearly does not fall into 
this category.
2
 The knowledge that can be ascribed to a human agent using the traditional model is thus far greater 
than what the agent can actually be expected to know. In order to better fit the task of analyzing systems with human 
agents, our modifications must provide a more realistic measure of the human agent’s limited ability to infer and to 
reason, and the limitations on human knowledge that result. 
7) Representing false knowledge 
As we have seen, the traditional possible-worlds definition of knowledge entails the Knowledge Axiom, stating 
that an agent knows only true facts, Ki   . In the case of an analysis of automated agents for whom knowledge is 
in any event an externally ascribed notion this does not appear to be troublesome. For human agents, however, false 
knowledge is a common state of affairs and a particularly relevant issue in human-automation interaction – we 
would wish to capture, for instance, aspects of the interface design that mislead the human operator into holding 
false beliefs.   
 
2 This point is most succinctly emphasized by Konolige [37] who notes that if humans were capable of unlimited reasoning, a chess player 
would know the outcome of a chess match immediately following the first move. 
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IV. DEFINING BOUNDED KNOWLEDGE IN A COMPLEX HUMAN-AUTOMATION SYSTEM 
A. An Appropriate 3-Tiered Syntactic Model of Human Knowledge  
We now propose a formalism in which the assumptions about the computational aspects and contents of an 
agent’s knowledge are limited, in order to more appropriately represent the bounded character of human knowledge. 
Rather than using possible-worlds semantics as the primary component, we will present a syntactic model in which 
the known facts will be obtained based on a restricted amount of reasoning, and in which what is boundedly known 
may not be true (for related approaches to syntactic knowledge see [13], [32]).  
We model the human's knowledge as a three-tiered structure. 
Tier 1 - Explicit knowledge 
At the base is the agent's explicit knowledge, which we intuitively think of as the raw information available from the 
system interface: clock readings, indicators, aural warnings, and so forth.  
Tier 2 - Automatic knowledge 
Based on the agent's explicit knowledge, we allow a set of ground (or “automatic”) conclusions, in which various 
propositions that may not be explicitly represented in the state are immediately observed. For example, the local 
state may contain two 5-digit numbers, and the agent may be expected to know immediately which of them is larger. 
Similarly, a driver in a residential zone that sees the odometer reading 70 mph (as part of his explicit knowledge) 
would automatically know that “I am speeding” is true.  
Tier 3 – Bounded Knowledge via deductions 
On top of the explicit knowledge and the ground conclusions it affords, we think of the agent as being able to 
perform a finite set of deductions. Each of these deductions will use the fact that a set of propositions appear at the 
ground and explicit knowledge tiers, to conclude that the agent knows a formula of interest. This is a strictly limited 
process however, in that knowledge that is deduced at this level cannot be used for further rounds of deduction.  
We now present the formal definition of this syntactic framework. First, we define the logical language L+, 
extending the language L by adding a “bounded knowledge” operator ˆ hK :  
 All formulas of L are formulas of L+,  
 if  is a formula of L+ then so is ˆ hK φ (thus, L
+ 
is closed under ˆ hK ), and 
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 L+ is closed under , , and Ki. 
Next, if  is the set of propositions, we define the set c =   {p: p} containing all propositions and their 
negations. We model the human agent's explicit knowledge by way of a function fh: Lh  
c
2 specifying which 
elements of the set c the agent explicitly knows to be true at any given local state lh Lh of the human agent. 
Observe that explicit knowledge will satisfy the Knowledge Axiom only if the function fh ensures that all explicit 
knowledge is true. 
The agent's ground knowledge, which we think of as being derived automatically from its explicit knowledge, is 
captured by way of a function ah: 
c
2  
c
2  that, when applied to a subset T c produces another such subset 
ah(T) = T
’
. In our setting, the function ah will be applied to sets T describing the agent's explicit knowledge. For ease 
of exposition, we think of the ground knowledge as extending the explicit knowledge, so that we formally require 
that ah be monotonic, so that T ah(T).  
Finally, we consider a deduction phase determined by a set Dh (typically finite) of implications of the form  
p1 p2… pk  
ˆ
hK , where pi  
c for i=1,2,…,k. 
We denote by dh(T) the application of the implications in Dh to a subset T 
c
 of propositional formulas. 
Formally,   
dh (T)  =  {
ˆ
hK p |p T} U {
ˆ
hK  | (p1 p2… pk  
ˆ
hK )  Dh and p1, p2,…,pk  T}. 
In words, the agent's bounded knowledge is obtained from applying a fixed set of deductions to its explicit and its 
ground knowledge. The latter, in turn is based on the explicitly available knowledge consisting, for example, of data 
presented on the man-machine interface in a control room. The fact that the deduction phase consists of a single step 
in which a finite number of deductions are applied enforces the boundedness of this type of knowledge, avoiding 
forms of logical omniscience.  
Putting these elements together, we define the knowledge of the human agent h by way of an epistemic setup h = 
(fh, ah, Dh). We think of the epistemic setup as encoding a 3-step process by which h’s structured knowledge is 
obtained as a function of its local state l:  
Step 1. The function fh is applied to the local state to obtain the agent's explicit knowledge.  
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Step 2. The function ah is applied to the result to account for the immediate conclusions that the agent draws 
automatically from its explicit knowledge.  
Step 3. The set of inferences available in the agent's mental model, captured by the Dh component, is applied once 
using the function dh and generates the agent's knowledge at l.  
Formally, applying h to a local state l yields the set h(l) = dh(ah(fh(l)))  consisting of knowledge formulas 
ˆ
hK  
that the human agent is taken to know at local state lh.  
An example will help to clarify. Let lh be the local state of a human agent h piloting an aircraft, and let time 
instant m at r(m) be the final approach just prior to landing. Among the many indicators in the cockpit is an indicator 
for the status of the flaps (trailing edges of the wings – full flaps is typically the normal status for optimized landing 
safety and efficiency) and an indicator for the status of the landing gear, which may be up, transitioning, or down 
and locked.  
The pilot’s local state lh at any time will consist of the status of these two indicators; for instance lh = 
((flaps.not.full, landing.gear.up) describes the pilot’s local state when the flaps are not at full extension and the 
landing gear is folded up into the airplane. In this local state the set of propositions that are true – the pilot’s explicit 
knowledge – are that the flaps are not fully extended and that the wheels are up. We’ll call these propositions p1 and 
p2, respectively. 
By applying the automatic ground knowledge function ah on this set of propositions the pilot also knows that the 
airplane is not configured for landing, and this immediate conclusion, call it p3, is added to the set of propositions 
that the pilot knows. For the third step in the process, we’ll assume that a trained pilot’s mental model includes an 
inference d that captures the rule ‘if on final approach then  full flaps and landing gear down and locked’. Applying 
this inference to the set of propositions p1, p2, and p3 for time instant m at r(m) = final approach generates the pilot 
agent’s knowledge of the formula  at local state l where  is  ‘ on final approach and aircraft not configured for 
final approach so go-around (return to altitude in order to safely configure aircraft for landing)’. Thus, ˆ hK  
describes the pilot’s bounded knowledge at l. 
B. Knowledge of Bad System Behavior 
A supervisory controller must at all times know whether the behavior of the system is within specified and 
acceptable bounds. In addition to system–specific knowledge formulas that will be part of the human agent’s 
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epistemic setup h, the agent is expected to know, at each local state l in which  the current global state is not in 
accordance with system specifications, that there is a problem.. We define pbad as a proposition standing for ‘the 
current behavior of the system is not acceptable’ where the notion of  “acceptable” would depend on the application. 
Moreover, we require that ˆ hK pbad be included in the set h(l) at any state of the system that  is not guaranteed to be 
within acceptable bounds. 
In the example above, if we assume there is nothing that precludes the go-around maneuver then the current 
behavior of the system is acceptable and the formula ˆ hK pbad, is not part of the pilot’s knowledge at this local state l. 
Alternately, if the pilot in this situation cannot execute the go-around maneuver then a bad state exists and ˆ hK pbad 
would be included in the pilot’s local state. 
At present we make the simplifying assumption that the human knows all the formulas in her epistemic setup 
h(l) from the instant that she is in l, and do not address the (more realistic) possibility that drawing even a simple 
set of inferences may require some time. While we can easily extend our approach to capture this distinction, the 
resulting definitions are somewhat cumbersome, and are beyond the scope of this paper. (See [33] for definitions of 
knowledge that take computational complexity into account.)  
C. The Epistemic System Model 
The mathematical model in which we can both define truth of formulas and generate the human agent’s 
knowledge will be an epistemic system E = (R, , h), where R is the set of possible runs,  is the interpretation of 
primitive propositions at the global states of R, and h is the epistemic setup of the human agent as described above. 
Truth of formulas in L + can now be defined with respect to E = (R, , h). At a given time m in a run r, we define: 
    (E,r,m) |=  p (for p)   iff (p)(r(m)) = True  
(E,r,m) |=        iff  both  (E,r,m) |=    and   (E,r,m) |=  
(E,r,m) |=      iff  it is not the case that  (E,r,m) |=  
    (E,r,m) |= ˆ hK       iff  
ˆ
hK   h(rh(m)) 
Finally, since the system R and the interpretation  are components of the epistemic system E= (R, , h), we can 
also define the truth of standard (possible-worlds) knowledge with respect to E.  For i=a,h,e: 
(E,r,m) |= Ki iff (E,r’,m’) |=  for all points (r’,m’)~i(r,m) 
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The latter clause will enable us to consider possible-worlds knowledge and bounded knowledge within the same 
framework. Recall that ˆ hK  represents a syntactic, rather than semantic, notion of knowledge. That is, what the 
human agent “knows” in each local state is a set of knowledge formulas that is determined by the epistemic setup 
h.. There is no a priori guarantee that this knowledge is true, or even consistent.  
Given an epistemic system E, we write E |=  (and say that  is valid, or tautologically true in E) if (E,r,m) |=  
holds for all points (r,m) of R.  
D. Criteria for Satisfactory Bounded Knowledge 
We now formalize the soundness and adequacy properties to enable the analysis of whether or not the human 
agent's bounded knowledge in an epistemic system E = (R, , h) is satisfactory for supervisory control. 
1) Soundness  
We say that an epistemic system E = (R, , h) is sound if the following two statements are true: 
1. For every (r, m) with r  R, if q  ah(fh(rh(m))) then (E,r,m) |= q. In words, for every point (r,m) in a run of R, 
if q is in the human agent’s explicit or automatic knowledge, then q is true at (r,m) in the epistemic system E. 
Moreover,  
2. E |= (p1  p2 … pk)   holds for every implication p1 … pk  
ˆ
hK   in Dh. 
Intuitively, soundness guarantees that E |= ˆ hK    holds, meaning that every conclusion that the human agent 
draws using its mental model is true at every point (r,m) in the epistemic system E. We will prove this fact formally 
in Corollary 1 below.  
The importance of soundness in this context is that it ensures that what the human agent is said to know according 
to ˆ hK  is in fact true. If the epistemic system E does not satisfy soundness, so that E |≠ 
ˆ
hK   , then there is one 
point at which there is at least one formula  known to  the agent  according to the epistemic system E is false. In 
this case, either an element of the agent’s explicit or automatic knowledge is incorrect, or an implication in Dh is 
incorrect (possibly both).  
The notion of soundness allows us to consider situations in which the knowledge available for supervisory control 
is incorrect. The faulty indicator light for low brake fluid mentioned previously is an example – if the indicator is 
malfunctioning and providing the explicit information ‘brake fluid indicator light off’, the driver may boundedly 
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know that the brake fluid is sufficient while in fact it is critically low. This is in comparison with a lack of required 
knowledge which is addressed by the adequacy criterion we consider next. 
2) Adequacy 
Though a human operator's knowledge of a complex system is incomplete by definition, we will say that the 
human’s knowledge is adequate for supervisory control only if the operator can always recognize unsafe system 
states and avoid anomalous system states and behaviors.
3
 That is, the agent must be able to use her own local state to 
determine whether the current state is acceptable.  For example, assume that a well-intentioned but somewhat 
confused cost-cutting designer concludes that since wheels are either up or down, having multiple indicators for 
wheel position is wasteful and that one ‘wheels up’ indicator should be sufficient. At any given time, the epistemic 
setup of the pilot of this low-cost airplane is comprised solely of fh(l) = pup: ‘wheels are up’ or its negation pup: ‘not 
(wheels are up)’, or more familiarly, ‘wheels are not up’. Landing of course is allowed only if wheels have 
completed transitioning and are locked in the 'down' position. However, the pilot's display does not allow her 
distinguish between the wheels being in transition, pup, and the wheels being locked in the down position and so the 
information available is not adequate for her to determine whether indeed the aircraft is configured for landing.  
To formalize adequacy in epistemic systems, recall that we defined pbad as a proposition standing for ‘the current 
state of the system is not acceptable.’ Moreover, we required that ˆ hK pbad hold at all points at which the global state 
is not in accordance with the system specification. We then say that an epistemic system E is adequate if the 
following hold: 
1. ˆ hK pbad  h((rh(m)) for all states of the system such that (E,r,m) |= pbad , thus  pbad  
ˆ
hK  pbad  is valid in E. 
Soundness must also hold so that the operator’s bounded knowledge of a bad state is true: 
2. E is sound, so that, in particular, E |= ˆ hK  pbad  pbad  
E. Human Knowledge and Possible Worlds Knowledge 
Our syntactic representation of bounded human knowledge via an epistemic system E makes no assumptions 
regarding logical omniscience, consistency of reasoning, or the actual truth value of the human agent’s knowledge. 
By using this approach we are able to capture an expressive and reasonable description of a system with human 
 
3 We refer here to significantly anomalous states and behaviors that impact overall performance or safety, and not the transient anomalies that 
are automatically corrected and are part of any complex system. 
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agents while at the same time we avoid the problems inherent in the application of the possible-worlds definition. 
However, is there a price to be paid for this useful tool set? Is it less formal, less precise, or does it limit the 
conclusions that can be reached regarding what the human agent knows?  
While additional work is needed to fully determine the limitations of our framework, we do claim that our 
approach precludes any arbitrary or specious claims to agent knowledge. As the following theorem and corollaries 
show, any proposition  that is known by human agent h in a sound system E is also known when knowledge is 
defined as truth in all possible worlds:  
Theorem 1: Let E = (R, , h) be an epistemic system and let L
 +
. If E is sound, then  E |= ˆ hK   Kh  . 
In words, this theorem states that any proposition  that the human agent (boundedly) knows in a sound epistemic 
system E is also known by that agent in the possible-worlds sense.  
Proof:  Suppose that E = (R, ,h) is sound. We need to show that if (E,r,m) |= 
ˆ
hK  then   (E,r,m) |= Kh   holds as 
well. By definition, (E,r,m) |= Kh   holds if (E,r’,m’) |=   holds at all points (r’,m’) satisfying (r’,m’)~h(r,m).  So let 
(E,r,m) |= ˆ hK   and (r’,m’)~h(r,m).  Denoting l= rh(m), we have that r’h(m’)= l as well. By definition of (E,r,m) |= 
ˆ
hK   we have that 
ˆ
hK   h(l) = dh(ah(fh(l))). By definition of h and dh this means that either (a)   = p 
ah(fh(l)) or (b) there is an implication   p1 … pk  
ˆ
hK   in Dh  with pi  ah(fh(l)) every  i=1,…,k. In case (a) we 
have by clause (1) of soundness that (E,r’,m’) |=  . In case (b) we have by clause (2) of soundness that E |= (p1  p2 
… pk)  . Since we also have by clause (1) that (E,r’,m’) |= pi  for every i,  it follows that (E,r’,m’) |= p1  p2 
… pk, and thus (E,r’,m’) |= , as desired. QED 
 
Since (r,m)~h(r,m) for all points (r,m), by definition, we have that standard (possible-worlds) knowledge satisfies 
the Knowledge Axiom (or knowledge property)  E |= Kh   . Given Theorem 1, it immediately follows that so 
does human agent knowledge:  
Corollary 1: If E is sound, then E |= ˆ hK     holds for all L
 +
. 
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Corollary 1 says that when a system E is sound, then every formula  in L + that the human agent boundedly 
knows to be true according to E is indeed true. A second corollary consists of the equivalent, contrapositive, form of 
Theorem 1: 
Corollary 2: If E is sound then  E |=  Kh   
ˆ
hK  . 
In other words, if human agent h does not know a proposition  in a system (R, ) according to the possible 
worlds definition of knowledge, then h will not know  in any sound epistemic system E extending the system (R, 
).  
 
The relationship between knowledge in an epistemic system and the classical possible worlds interpretation of 
knowledge demonstrates that our approach is fundamentally grounded, with Theorem 1 and its corollaries 
collectively providing the formal support.  
Assume, for instance, that there is an epistemic system E that models the knowledge of the agents in a complex 
human-automation system S. In E there is a local state l of the human agent at which h boundedly knows a 
proposition q. According to Theorem 1, if E is sound, then h must also know q when at l according to the possible 
worlds approach. Thus if E is sound, any proposition that the human agent knows in our modified approach is 
indeed true. 
This relationship between the two approaches allows us also to demonstrate when the design of a given system R 
makes satisfactory knowledge impossible. If for example we show that for a state in R satisfying pbad the human 
agent does not know pbad at that state, then by Corollary 2 no epistemic system for R can be adequate and sound, and 
the design of R is fundamentally flawed. The design must be changed - perhaps by adding explicit information to the 
human agent states - before an adequate epistemic setting can be obtained.  
Epistemic systems are a framework for reasoning about knowledge in complex human-automation systems that 
allows us to expressively describe the knowledge a human agent has available for supervisory control. At the same 
time, the framework allows us to formally determine if that knowledge enables effective system performance.   
In the remainder of the paper we discuss a representative case study in which our approach is used to model and 
analyze the classic Therac-25 problem [10]. We use the formalism to describe the knowledge available to the human 
operator as a function of the system’s design, to prove that the existing design precludes effective supervisory 
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control, and to identify the knowledge that is lacking. Following, we show that once missing knowledge is made 
available (by a change in the interface in this case), effective supervisory control is enabled. In this manner we 
establish the viability, value, and correctness of thinking formally about human-automation systems at the level of 
the knowledge in the system, and what agents know.  
V. THE THERAC-25 DEVICE PROBLEM  OVERVIEW 
The case study is presented at two levels of detail. The first, immediately following, is a high-level overview 
discussion that aims to enhance an intuitive understanding of our approach and its value for reasoning about 
complex human-automation systems. The second, included in the Appendix, is a complete formal representation of 
the problem and the solution. 
A. Problem Description 
“Between June 1985 and January 1987, a computer-controlled radiation therapy machine, called the Therac-25, 
massively overdosed six people. These accidents have been described as the worst in the [then] 35-year history of 
medical accelerators” [10].  
 
During investigation of the Therac-25 failures, a common factor in two of the accidents was the device’s operator. 
In both cases, the operator had started and completed the patient data entry task, and then had gone back to edit one 
or more values before starting the treatment.  
Analysis showed that the operator’s data entry speed was the cause of the machine’s behavior – while editing data 
was an allowable function, the operator was able to edit the data and return to a ‘data entry complete’ state so 
quickly that the machine did not record, and hence was never aware,  that the data editing had occurred. The 
operator then initiated treatment believing that dosage would be in accordance with the newly edited parameter 
values displayed on the interface, while the actual dosage was given to the patient according to the original data 
values. 
Several flaws in the system’s design were implicated in the accidents. The faulty design introduced a system state 
during which the treatment values could be edited, and the machine activated, without the new values actually being 
processed. Furthermore, the interface provided almost no information to the operator about the internal behavior of 
the machine, and the operator thus had no way of knowing whether the machine had accepted her data editing.  
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B. Modeling the System 
In order to reason more clearly about the problem and potential solutions we first need to generate a more formal 
representation of the significant elements of the Therac-25 problem.  
1) Agents 
There are two agents that must be included in the model, the human operator h, and the Therac-25 device, denoted 
a. (Reference to the environment is omitted in this example, as the device is deterministic and so the environment 
plays no essential role.)  
2) Local states 
The human operator’s local states in this example capture the information that is available via the Therac-25 
device’s interface. For instance, the operator’s local states will include a variable representing the status of data 
entry or modification, and a variable for the ‘ready-to-treat’ status of the device, as presented to the operator by the 
interface. The machine’s local states consist of variables indicating whether there is complete data entry, whether the 
entered data has been modified, and whether the system is in treat mode. 
3) Actions and joint actions 
In each state, the operator h and the machine a perform actions that may change the global state. The operator of 
the Therac-25 device can input data, modify the data entered, initiate treatment, or do nothing. The device can 
process data that has been entered, treat, or do nothing. 
4) Dynamic system behavior  
We represent the dynamic behavior of the combined operator-device system by defining the possible transitions 
between global states as a function of the operator’s and the device’s joint actions. For example, consider the global 
state g0 as the initial state in which the operator has not yet entered any treatment data. A possible joint action in this 
state would be for the operator to enter treatment data and the Therac device to do nothing. This joint action would 
cause the system to transition to a global state g1 in which the treatment data has been entered but not yet processed. 
By defining all possible transitions between states we can obtain a complete model of the system’s set of possible 
behaviors (which will form our set of possible runs R). A crucial task in modeling the behavior of the system is to 
identify behaviors that are unacceptably anomalous, so that the set of points (r,m) in R at which pbad is true may be 
clearly defined. 
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5) Modeling the human’s knowledge 
The next step in development of the model is to define and formally represent the operator’s knowledge in each of 
the states of the system; this is the knowledge, the epistemic setup h, that the operator has in order to control the 
system.  
We start by generating the set of primitive propositions or facts that are relevant to the complete system’s 
dynamic behavior. For instance, facts such as ‘no treatment data is entered’ and ‘device is ready to treat’ would be 
part of this set. The truth value of these facts at a given time will be a function of the actions of the operator and the 
machine, and the physical dynamics of the complete system. Thus, for example, the proposition ‘no treatment data is 
entered’ will be true only if the operator has not yet entered any treatment data. 
We then add new propositions of ground or automatic knowledge such as ‘data is entered accurately’. 
As the final step in modeling the operator’s bounded knowledge we define the implications that would comprise 
the operator’s mental model knowledge used to interpret the explicit knowledge in her local state. The Therac 
operator’s mental model might include the implication ‘if data entry is complete and the device is ready to treat and 
the entered data is correct then treatment can be initiated’; in a local state in which the propositions ‘data entry is 
complete’, ‘the device is ready to treat’, and ‘entered data is correct’ are true,  the operator would know that 
treatment can be initiated. Critically, the operator’s mental model must also include the implications that enable 
knowledge of anomalous system behaviors, so that the agent knows when pbad is true. 
C. Satisfactory Knowledge and Possible-Worlds Knowledge in the Therac-25 Problem 
Once the system’s behavior and the operator’s bounded knowledge have been modeled, we use our definitions of 
soundness and adequacy to analyze the system and demonstrate that the Therac-25 operator’s bounded knowledge as 
modeled is not satisfactory for supervisory control. Examining the model within the possible worlds framework 
shows further that the design of the Therac-25 is flawed and so renders satisfactory knowledge impossible. 
To begin, recall that the operator of the Therac device boundedly knows that treatment data values can be 
modified prior to initiating the patient’s treatment. We assume that in a given run r the operator modifies previously 
entered data, the device processes the data and displays its ‘ready to treat’ status, and the operator initiates treatment. 
In this run r the device functions as expected and treats the patient in accordance with the modified data; the 
operator knows the system behavior is acceptable. 
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Now we consider another run r’ in which the operator’s actions are the same as in run r but the device does not 
process the new data prior to treatment being initiated. Thus pbad holds once treatment is initiated. Since the 
operator’s local states in r’ are the same as in r she will have the same knowledge as in r, and so boundedly knows 
that the system behavior is acceptable. There is no indication in her local states that once treatment is initiated, pbad 
holds.  
 In both runs r and r’, at the point m at which treatment data has been edited, the proposition p 
= ‘device is ready to treat’ is part of the operator’s explicit knowledge, (E,r,m) |= ˆ hK p and 
(E,r’,m’) |= ˆ hK p . However, since in run r’ at (r’,m) the edited data has not yet been processed 
by the device then p is false in (r’,m’), as is the operator’s knowledge of p. Soundness, a 
necessary property of satisfactory knowledge, therefore does not hold. 
 In run r’, though pbad holds after initiation of treatment, pbad is not in the operator’s local state 
and so adequacy does not hold. 
 While at point (r,m) treatment data has been edited and processed by the device, there is 
another point (r',m') at which the human operator has the same state as at (r,m), so that 
(r,m)~h(r’,m’), but at which the new data has not been processed by the device.   Thus, while 
the operator boundedly knows p at both (r,m) and at (r’,m’), p is true at one point and false at 
another.  Since (r,m)~h(r’,m’), Khp (stated in terms of possible-world knowledge) does not 
hold. Corollary 2 implies that no epistemic system for this device can be adequate: there is 
guaranteed to be a bad state that the operator will be unable to detect as such. 
The impossibility of satisfactory knowledge for supervisory control of the Therac-25 system is thus shown. This 
is discussed further and formally proved in the Appendix. 
D. Problem Resolution 
In addition to supporting a fine-grained analysis of a complex human-automation system, our approach provides 
clear direction for problem resolution. In the case of the Therac-25 problem, the knowledge-based model and 
analysis suggests the need for a design modification that provides the operator with the information needed to truly 
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know that the device has processed the operator’s edited data values and so is indeed ready to treat.4 This 
modification would allow the operator to easily determine the true ‘ready to treat’ status of the device and so should 
preclude the possibility of initiating treatment with incorrect treatment data.  
E. Supporting Design Modification Via Bounded Knowledge 
It remains to demonstrate, using our formal framework, that this modification does indeed result in a system in 
which the knowledge available is satisfactory for supervisory control. Again assume that there is a state g in which 
treatment data has been edited and processed by the device, and a state g’ in which treatment data has been edited 
but not processed by the device.  
Let E
m 
be the epistemic system that models the knowledge of the operator and device in the Therac-25 system 
modified as described in section 5.4. In the local state l, the operator’s epistemic setup h(l) = dh(ah(fh(l))) now 
contains a knowledge formula ˆ hK  representing the operator’s bounded knowledge of the global system’s 
readiness to treat.  
For this system E
m
 to be sound, i.e., for what the operator boundedly knows to indeed be true, the operator must 
know that the system is ready to treat within the possible worlds framework, as well. It is easy to see that this is so. 
In any global state g’ in which treatment data had been edited but not yet processed by the device, the modified 
device would provide an indication to the operator that the system is not ready to treat. The operator would thus 
know that the system is ready to treat only in states in which the system truly is ready to treat. That is, in E
m
 the 
proposition ‘ready to treat’ is true in any state or world in which the operator boundedly knows it to be true. This 
demonstrates that the suggested modification generates a sound epistemic system E
m
.  
Theorem 4 in the appendix states this in more formal terms, and provides proof that the knowledge available with 
this modification is satisfactory for supervisory control. 
F. Summary 
The goal of this section was to provide an initial intuitive example of how our approach may be applied to a real 
system. Though for most complex systems of interest neither the model nor the solution will be nearly as easy to 
define, this Therac-25 example shows how a ‘real-life’ system may be modeled, and its human-automation interface 
 
4 We do not suggest that adding display elements for each fact the human needs to know is a desirable or even viable solution option. Display 
optimization for the knowledge that is identified as necessary is (far) outside the scope of this research.  
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design evaluated, using the knowledge of its operator. For the interested reader the complete detailed model and 
analysis is included in the Appendix. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this article we presented an initial attempt to utilize a well-established formal theory of knowledge and action 
in multi-agent systems in order to conduct a knowledge-based analysis of a complex human-automation system. 
This approach allows us to reason cleanly and rigorously about the design and performance of a system as a function 
of one of its most fundamental resources – the knowledge of the agents. The Therac-25 analysis revealed the 
existence of design flaws in the system that precluded the human agent from being an effective supervisory 
controller, and identified the knowledge that was missing. No additional theories of performance or behavior were 
required, and the human and automation agents were depicted using an expressive common construct without losing 
important and unique properties of either of these distinct agents. The example demonstrated that our approach 
offers a formal, expressive, and parsimonious methodology for the design and analysis of complex systems, and we 
believe this to be a significant contribution. As an initial step in a new direction, the work discussed here raises 
many intriguing points for investigation; we briefly discuss several that we believe particularly worthy of further 
pursuit.  
A. A Richer Notion of Human Knowledge 
A first A first direction for further research is to expand on and more completely define a notion of human 
knowledge within our formal framework. For instance, we may wish to consider a classification of human 
knowledge in terms of its contents in addition to the type-based taxonomy defined in the current paper, such as the 
declarative / procedural dimension often used in cognitive modeling [34]-[36]. In this manner we may gain a more 
multi-dimensional model of human knowledge that would render our approach useful in a wider range of problem 
domains.  
Another aspect of human knowledge that is important in supervisory control is the distinction between knowledge 
and belief. By capturing the important distinction between a human operator formally knowing a fact p and 
believing p, we can more precisely investigate the impact of incorrect human belief on system performance. Belief 
has been formally represented using a number of techniques [30], [37], and a valuable goal is to identify and build 
on the technique most appropriate for modeling a notion of human belief in domains of interest. 
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An additional element of human knowledge and reasoning that is particularly important in the supervisory control 
context is the concept of counterfactual reasoning (‘if p were to hold then q would be true’) [38]. When an operator 
plans future actions, especially error recovery actions, counterfactual reasoning supports the operator’s consideration 
of conditional alternatives and the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios [39], [40]. The ability to reason about and 
identify the knowledge needed for effective counterfactual reasoning will be useful in the design of more robust 
systems that provide the information needed for an operator to successfully 'think through' novel, perhaps safety-
critical situations. Preliminary work suggests that incorporating an existing formalization of counterfactual 
reasoning [27] into our approach will provide designers with a means to do so.   
Once these elements of human knowledge are added to our framework, the approach will support the modeling 
and analysis of a wider and more realistic set of complex systems. For example, a designer could more accurately 
evaluate the potential failure conditions of supervisory control inherent in a system that executes in a highly 
ambiguous environment by limiting the human agent's knowledge of important automation and environment agent 
behaviors. We may be able to capture differences in system performance that result from differences in the amount 
or quality of knowledge possessed by the human controller. If qualitative differences in knowledge distinguish 
between novice and expert human operators [41], [42], for example, this would allow a designer to gauge the 
vulnerability of the system to novice supervisory control and might make salient required emphases in training. 
There are, no doubt, many additional aspects of human agent knowledge that are relevant to our problem domain 
and that are amenable to formal representation in our framework; it is an interesting extension of our work to 
identify them. Again, the goal should not be to draw a true and faithful picture of human knowledge, but rather to 
develop a representation that is epistemically adequate [43] and that allows us to reason expressively and formally 
about important properties of human knowledge within the context of complex systems.  
B. Extending the Formal Model 
Our formalization of human knowledge has drawn on various approaches in epistemic logic to create a framework 
that is expressive enough to begin capturing the unique properties of human agent knowledge without sacrificing the 
rigor of formal logic. Our approach can, as well, formally represent different types of reasoning that a human agent 
might do, perhaps in different circumstances or in different systems. Previously we noted that our current definition 
of a 'one-shot' round of reasoning captures an intuitive notion of how a human agent might reason in a supervisory 
control setting. That is, since complex systems are normally dynamic systems in which control decisions need to be 
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made and implemented in a timely manner, the operator’s reasoning activities cannot require multiple rounds of 
reasoning. One-shot reasoning captures the resource bounds that would be expected due both to the human's 
inherently limited reasoning abilities as well as to the requirements of a context in which control decisions need to 
be made and implemented in a timely manner. 
It will be interesting to expand on this initial work and identify additional patterns of inference that can be used to 
express human reasoning, the systems in which they may be appropriate, and the means by which they should be 
formalized. More precise bounds on reasoning may also be identified. For instance, within the one-shot model, how 
many independent instances of simple deductive inference can a human do? A system's design might require a 
human to infer, in the same round, n separate conclusions. Can this requirement be satisfied by typical human 
cognitive resources? Can we augment the one-shot model with a multi-step (i.e. algorithmic) representation of more 
complex human reasoning? What might be the natural resource bounds for this type of reasoning actions? 
C. Knowledge of Groups of Agents in Human-Automation Systems 
One of the most significant contributions of the knowledge formalism has been its ability to express notions of the 
knowledge of groups of agents, such as agents’ knowledge of other agents’ knowledge, distributed knowledge 
(knowledge is distributed between the agents in the system), and common knowledge (that is, all the agents know a 
fact p, and know that all agents know p, and so on…) [3]. This expressiveness supports analysis of centrally 
important system properties such as the need for an agent to know what another agent knows, the additional 
knowledge made available by a fact being commonly known, the potential performance cost when system failure 
precludes a needed fact from being common knowledge, and so forth.   
The importance of being able to reason formally about the knowledge of groups of agents in the design and 
analysis of human-automation systems is significant, as noted in [44]-[46]. For a simple example, recall the search-
and-rescue robot team mentioned previously. Not only must the designer consider what the human and robot agents 
need to know in any state of the system, but since the robot is normally remotely operated (e.g. it is deep in a 
collapsed building looking for survivors) the designer must be able to capture what the human and robot agents can 
know about each other's knowledge at any point in time in order to determine whether the knowledge of the agents 
will be sufficient for task performance.  
It is important to explore the knowledge of groups of agents within the context of human-automation systems. 
Our work will consider these notions both from a conceptual perspective – for instance, what does it really mean to 
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say that human and automation agents have common knowledge of a fact? – and in terms of formal modeling 
considerations.  
What are the theoretical issues of shared knowledge relevant to a human-automation system? It is natural to say 
that an operator may need to know what the automation knows, but when is it useful (and meaningful) to talk about 
an automation agent knowing what a human agent knows or what other automation agents know? Considering 
various forms of human-robot teams, for example, the need for a robot to know what the human agent knows seems 
clear in the case of search and rescue, personal assistant, or physical therapy robots [47]. Can we define general 
taxonomies of human-automation and human-robot systems in which specific types of group knowledge are 
required for system performance?   
The knowledge formalism provides a complete formal semantics and structures for the modeling and analysis of 
various types of group knowledge. We thus have the tools to represent and reason about the knowledge of every 
agent in the group, EG, distributed knowledge in the group, DG, and common knowledge, CG.,. An important 
direction for our work is to further investigate the notion of group knowledge for human-automation systems. As 
systems grow in size (number of agents), in heterogeneity (types of agents), and in the criticality of the mission, a 
common concept that binds all agents and that provides a rigorous method for evaluation will become an imperative. 
We believe this last direction for our research program to be particularly significant.   
D. Applications 
The final test of any formal approach for modeling and analysis is its applicability to real-world problems in the 
intended domains. The Therac-25 device problem discussed in this article served as a benchmark for demonstrating 
that our approach (1) can expressively capture important properties of human and non-human agents, (2) can enable 
us to answer queries about what human and non-human agents know and don’t know, and (3) can be used to draw 
significant conclusions regarding a complex system's design in spite of the dissimilarity of its agents. While these 
results offer an important initial ‘proof-of-concept’, the Therac-25 problem is a cleanly bounded and thoroughly 
researched scenario with faults in design identified a priori. What is the value of our formalism as a modeling and 
analysis tool for systems that are not as neatly defined or for which answers are not as clear?   
The state-of-the-art in human-automation system design will provide a valuable test-bed of systems for evaluating 
our approach ‘in real-life’; we are particularly interested in systems in the aviation and human-robot teams domains. 
In the aviation domain, current directions in integrated flight deck systems design, aviation information 
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management, and the evolving role of the pilot as supervisory controller underscore the inherent relevance of a 
knowledge-based approach. Will our formalism be able to provide useful insight regarding the design of these 
highly complex and sophisticated systems?  
The application of our formalism to the modeling and analysis of human-robot teams will serve as another 
challenging and rigorous test of its viability. On the one hand, the importance of capturing notions of agent 
knowledge and common knowledge, and the need for a formal method for reasoning about knowledge in this 
domain, have already been noted in the literature [45], [48], and so the potential value of our approach is clear. On 
the other hand, these systems have unique properties that make accurate and useful representation exceptionally 
difficult. A knowledge-based model of a human-robot team will need to capture the (albeit artificial) intelligence of 
the non-human robotic agents and the often hostile environment within which these systems operate (e.g. the 
collapsed buildings environment of search and rescue teams). Too, our approach must be able to represent and 
reason usefully about the complex and dynamic patterns of communication and knowledge distribution between 
multiple human and non-human agents that are to be found in this domain. Consider that in a team of humans and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) the multiple UAVs may communicate among themselves to maintain formation 
and ensure surveillance coverage while information regarding potential targets is transmitted to the human operator. 
Or the operator may communicate different commands to different UAVs, and receive different responses, which 
may be a function of the UAV’s reasoning ability and knowledge, rather than just data. How best to capture the role 
of the knowledge of all the agents in this and similar systems? What insights can we gain here using our knowledge-
based approach? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As noted in the introduction to this work, the critical nature of many human-automation systems impose a clear 
need for rigorous design and analysis tools that are practically useful. This is well-recognized, and the development 
of methods and tools has been an active area of research for many years. Unfortunately the highly complex nature of 
many of the tools too often results in their isolation in academic and scientific arenas. Subsequently, practical system 
design remains to a large extent a somewhat ad hoc process. 
Towards that end we have introduced and described the initial development of a novel approach to modeling and 
reasoning about these systems that is intended to both satisfy the need for formal rigor and be sufficiently intuitive 
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for practical use. One of the most significant aspects of this framework is that agent knowledge is ascribed and 
analyzed with respect to the automaton representing the complete given human-automation system. Our initial 
results suggest that reasoning about these systems from the perspective of agent knowledge is in fact a viable and 
valuable approach. conclusion section is not required. Although a conclusion may review the main points of the 
paper, do not replicate the abstract as the conclusion. A conclusion might elaborate on the importance of the work or 
suggest applications and extensions.  
APPENDIX 
VIII. THE THERAC-25 DEVICE PROBLEM – DETAILED ANALYSIS 
A. Problem Description 
“Between June 1985 and January 1987, a computer-controlled radiation therapy machine, called the Therac-25, 
massively overdosed six people. These accidents have been described as the worst in the [then] 35-year history of 
medical accelerators” [10].  
 
During investigation of the Therac-25 failures, a common factor in two of the accidents was the device’s operator. 
In both cases, the operator had started and completed the patient data entry task, and then had gone back to edit one 
or more values before starting the treatment.  
Analysis showed that the operator’s data entry speed was the cause of the machine’s behavior – while editing data 
was an allowable function, the operator was able to edit the data and return to a ‘data entry complete’ state so 
quickly that the machine was never aware that the data editing had occurred. The operator then initiated treatment 
believing that dosage would be in accordance with the newly edited parameter values displayed on the interface, 
while the actual dosage given to the patient was as defined by the original data values. 
Several flaws in the system’s design were implicated in the accidents. The faulty design introduced a system state 
during which the treatment values could be edited, and the machine activated, without the new values actually being 
processed. Further, the interface provided almost no information to the operator about the internal behavior of the 
machine, and the operator thus had no way of knowing whether the machine had accepted her data editing.  
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B. Modeling the System 
1) Agents 
The two agents in our model of the system are the human operator, denoted h, and the Therac-25 device, denoted 
a. (Including the environment in this model does not alter the analysis and so we do not add it here.) 
2) Local states 
The local states of each agent consist of the variables or information the agent has available in that state. The 
human operator’s local states, which capture the information available via the interface, include a variable 
representing the status of data entry or modification, and a variable for the ‘ready-to-treat’ status of the device. Lh is 
the set of possible states for the human agent which have the form lh = (data.entry, system.status), where the 
possible values for each variable are: 
data.entry  {, data.in, new.data.in}, corresponding to no data entered (i.e. treatment set-up has not yet begun), 
initial data entry complete, modified data entry complete, respectively. Note that by design the status of data entry is 
complete only when all required fields are filled and the cursor is in a specified field. This signifies to the system 
that data entry is complete, and normally triggers the system’s processing of the entered data. 
system.status  {sys.ready.no, sys.ready.yes, treat}, indicating whether the system is not ready to treat, ready to 
treat, or treating. 
 
The machine’s local states consist of variables indicating whether there is complete data entry, whether the 
entered data has been modified, and whether the system is treating. La is the set of possible states for the automation 
device which have the form la = (data, new.data, status); the possible values for each variable are 
data  {, treat.data}, 
new.data  {new.no, new.yes},  
status  {ready.no, ready.yes, treat}. 
3) Actions and joint actions 
The operator of the Therac-25 device can input data, modify the data entered, initiate treatment, or do nothing (a 
null action, denoted ); ACTh = {input.data, modify.data, press.treat, }. 
The device can process data, treat, or do nothing; ACTa = {process.data, treat, }. 
The joint actions of the human and automation agents are thus: 
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(input.data, ) 
(, process.data) 
(modify.data, ) 
(modify.data, process.data) 
(press.treat, treat) 
(press.treat, ) 
(,) 
4) Local states and protocols 
The operator’s local states Lh and the protocol ACTh defining the actions allowable in each local state lh are listed 
below. 
The human operator’s local states are: 
Lh = {(, sys.ready.no), (data.in, sys.ready.no), (data.in, sys.ready.yes), (new.data.in, sys.ready.no), (new.data.in, 
sys.ready.yes), (data.in, treating), (new.data.in, treating)} 
 
The operator’s protocolACTh is: 
ACTh(, sys.ready.no) = {input.data}  {} 
ACTh(data.in, sys.ready.no) = {modify.data}  {} 
ACTh(data.in,sys.ready.yes) = {press.treat}  {modify.data}  {} 
ACTh(new.data.in, sys.ready.no) = {modify.data}  {} 
ACTh(new.data.in, sys.ready.yes) = {press.treat}  {modify.data}  {} 
ACTh(data.in, treating) =  
ACTh(new.data.in, treating) =  
 
The Therac-25 device’s local states La and the protocol ACTh defining the actions allowable in each local state la 
are listed below.  
 
Therac-25 local states: 
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La = {(, new.no, ready.no), (treat.data, new.no, ready.no), (treat.data, new.no, ready.yes), (treat.data, new.yes, 
ready.no), (treat.data, new.yes, ready.yes), (treat.data, new.no, treat), (treat.data, new.yes, treat)} 
 
Therac-25 actions ACTa 
ACTa(, new.no, ready.no) =  
ACTa(treat.data, new.no, ready.no) = process.data 
ACTa(treat.data, new.no, ready.yes) = {treat}  {} 
ACTa(treat.data, new.yes, ready.no) = process.data 
ACTa(treat.data, new.yes, ready.yes) = {treat}  {} 
ACTa(treat.data, new.no, treat) = treat 
ACTa(treat.data, new.yes, treat) = treat 
5) Dynamic system behavior  
The system’s dynamic behavior is represented as the set of runs R that result from the operator's protocol above 
and the automaton's protocol, in which the transitions from one global state to the next are in accordance with a 
transition function ; the complete set of possible runs is defined to be all executions of the automaton in Fig. 1. 
Note that we assume a correctly operating device and so anomalous behaviors that might arise should the device 
malfunction are not included. We also bound the scope of the model by defining the states in which treatment has 
been initiated as end states. Finally, in the interest of readability the automaton does not display the self-loops that 
result from joint null actions (,) or from actions that have no effect (e.g. the operator action treat when the 
machine is ‘not.ready’.) 
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g0 = ((Æ , sys.ready.no), 
(Æ , new.no, ready.no))
g1 = ((data.in, sys.ready.no), 
(treat.data, new.no, ready.no))
g2 = ((data.in, sys.ready.yes), 
(treat.data, new.no, ready.yes))
g4 = ((new.data.in, sys.ready.yes), 
(treat.data, new.no, ready.yes))
g3 = ((new.data.in, sys.ready.no), 
(treat.data, new.yes, ready.no))
g6 = ((new.data.in, sys.ready.yes), 
(treat.data, new.yes, ready.yes))
(input.data, )
(modify.data, )
(, process.data)
(, process.data)
(press.treat, treat)
(press.treat, treat)
g7 = ((new.data.in, treating), 
(treat.data, new.yes, treat))
g5 = ((new.data.in, treating), 
(treat.data, new.no, treat))
(modify.data, )
g8 = ((data.in, treating), 
(treat.data, new.no, treat))
(press.treat, treat)
(modify.data, 
process.data)
(modify.data, 
process.data)
(, treat) (, treat)
(, treat)
 
Fig. 1. An automaton describing dynamic behavior of the Therac human-automation system 
C. Impossibility of a Sound Epistemic Setup for the Therac Example 
A logical treatment of the Therac example would start defining a set  of primitive propositions or facts that are 
relevant to the system’s dynamic behavior; For example, we may have  = {p1,…,p6} where  
p1 = ‘no treatment data is entered’  
p2 = ‘initial data entry is complete’  
p3 = ‘modified data entry is complete’  
p4 = ‘modified data entry has been processed’  
p5 = ‘device is ready to treat’  
p6 = ‘device is treating’  
 
 is derived from the Therac 25 system specification; it represents system design assumptions regarding the 
knowledge an operator is required to have. Recall that, in general, the proposition pbad should capture the statement 
‘the current state of the system is not acceptable’. In every particular system, pbad will correspond to a property 
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specific to that system. In the Therac-25 example, we identify pbad with p4  p6 : A state in which the operator has 
modified the data and the device is treating but the treatment is not in accordance with the defined values.  
At any given time in system behavior, the truth value of each proposition in  is well-defined based on its 
description in words above. This truth value is a function of the agents’ actions and the physical dynamics of the 
complete system. For instance, the proposition p3  standing for ‘modified data entry complete’ will be true only if 
the operator has indeed completed data entry and returned the cursor to the correct field; the proposition p4 , 
‘modified data entry has been processed,’ holds only when the Therac device has recognized that the data has been 
modified and has reset its treatment parameters. More specifically, the interpretation  that maps the propositions pi 
  and the global states g to True or False captures the behavior of the Therac human-automation system as 
designed. 
In this post hoc analysis, we can straightforwardly show that no sound epistemic system exists for the design 
depicted in Figure 1.   
 
Theorem 2: There can be no adequate epistemic setup E for the existing design of the Therac-25 
 
Proof: As suggested in the main text, we prove this result via the connection between possible-worlds knowledge 
and bounded knowledge. Let R be the set of runs of the automaton depicted in Figure 1. Let rR be a run whose first 
four global states are g0, g1, g4 and g5, and similarly let r' be a run with prefix g0, g1, g2, g3, g6, g7.  Observe that 
r(4)=g5, while r'(6)=g7.  In the run r the operator enters initial data, and then enters a modified version of the data, 
while the device processes the initial data, and signals that data entry is complete. Once the system ready indication 
is displayed the operator initiates treatment. Treatment is not, however, in accordance with the new data and 
thus(R,r,4)|= pbad . In the run r', the operator enters initial data, this data is processed by the device, the operator 
enters modified data, and the new data is also processed. In this case, the processed data coincides with the latest 
entered data, and so (R,r',6)|= pbad. The crucial point is that (r,4) ~h (r',6). It follows that (R,r,4)|= pbad  Kh pbad . 
By Corollary 2, we have that (E,r,4)|= pbad  
ˆ
hK  pbad  for every epistemic setup E for the system R. It follows that 
there can be no adequate epistemic setup for R.   
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D. Problem Resolution 
Our approach not only identifies problems with agent knowledge, but provides insight into problem resolution 
and the means to determine whether the resolution is adequate. For the Therac-25 system, the modeling and analysis 
process suggests possible and provably correct solutions. In the situation described above it was shown that the 
operator had no way of determining that the device had processed the data, nor was she aware of the bad state once 
treatment was initiated prior to data processing. A straightforward design solution would be to modify the interface 
so that information regarding the device’s data processing status would be always available. For instance, the 
operator’s modification to the entered data might disable further system action and cause the system ready indicator 
to turn red. Only once new data had been completely entered and then processed by the device would the device 
display a data.ready signal to the control panel, in the operator's local view. In this manner, the human operator 
would be able to know when treatment could be initiated safely.  
A sound and adequate epistemic setting for this modified design would have the following features. We add 
another proposition p7 to , standing for "the value of data.ready is no". The operator's bounded knowledge of 
system readiness to treat after modification of treatment values would then be based on the explicit information 
available on the interface display. It is straightforward to see that this change eliminates the design flaw that 
precluded satisfactory operator knowledge. 
E. Conclusion 
This Therac-25 problem model and its suggested solution were simplified in order to serve as a straightforward 
example of how our approach may be applied. Note that multiple iterations of the analysis and solution definition 
process will derive a system design that is provably satisfactory for supervisory control. Though for most complex 
systems of interest neither the model nor the solution will be nearly as easy to define
5
, the Therac-25 example has 
shown how a ‘real-life’ system may be modeled, and its human-automation interface design evaluated, using the 
knowledge of its operator.  
  
 
5 We also do not suggest that adding display elements for each fact the human needs to know is a desirable or even viable solution option. 
Display optimization for the knowledge that is identified as necessary is (far) outside the scope of this research.  
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